Bakke: A Compelling Need to Discriminate by St. Antoine, Theodore J.
University of Michigan Law School
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles Faculty Scholarship
1977
Bakke: A Compelling Need to Discriminate
Theodore J. St. Antoine
University of Michigan Law School, tstanton@umich.edu
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1529
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Fourteenth Amendment Commons, Law
and Race Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the Supreme Court of the United States
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
St. Antoine, Theodore J. "Bakke: A Compelling Need to Discriminate." Learning & L. 4 (1977): 14–7, 55.
DAl<KE: 
A COMPELLING NEED 
TO DISCRIMIN~TE 
BY THEODORE ST. Al1TOINE 
Dean. Michigan Law School 
FOURTEEN 
Two of America's most cherished values collided 
head-on a few months ago, when the U.S. Supreme 
Court began to come to grips with the most significant 
civil rights suit since the school desegregation cases of 
1954. Arrayed on one side is the principle of govern-
mental "color-blindness," the appealing notion that 
the color of a person's skin should have nothing to do 
with the distribution of benefits or burdens by the 
state. 
Set against it is the goal of a truly integrated soci-
ety, and the tragic realization that this objective can-
not be achieved within the foreseeable future unless 
race and color are taken into account by educators, 
employers, and other key decision-makers, both 
public and private. 
Did the special admissions program at the Univer-
sity of California at Davis violate the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal 
Constitution? Allan Bakke said it did, and the 
Supreme Court of California concurred when it sus-
tained Bakke's complaint-at least in the absence of a 
clearer demonstration that Davis could not integrate 
its medical school without resorting to racial 
preferences. 
Although distinguished legal authorities have said 
the Constitution is "color-blind ," the Constitution 
itself says no such thing. All that the Fourteenth 
Amendment guarantees is "the equal protection of 
the laws." The mandate of equal treatment, however, 
would seem to presuppose equal status or cir-
cumstances. It is not unconstitutional to require the 
rich to pay higher taxes than the poor, or to impose 
military obligations on the young and healthy and not 
on the old or the infirm, or to provide emergency 
funds for the victims of natural disasters. Whether 
government-sponsored preferences based on race are 
constitutionally permissible should also depend, one 
can reasonably maintain, upon an examination of the 
similarity or dissimilarity in the contemporary situa-
tion of whites and minorities. 
Arguably, of course, racial distinctions are 
unique- a particular target of the post-Civil War 
amendments-and not to be compared with distinc-
tions based on wealth or age or physical condition or 
acts of God. And indeed the Supreme Court has 
declared that race is a "suspect" governmental 
classification. But even racial preferences may be 
justified if they serve a compelling state interest and 
are the least drastic means of accomplishing an ap-
propriate end. 
Moreover, whel,'e racial classtfication is used for 
" benign" purposes, that is, to benefit rather than 
disadvantage a minority group, some scholars con-
tend that the less strict "rational basis" test of con· 
FIFTEEN 
stitutionality should be applied. The Supreme Court 
has upheld employment preferences for American In-
dians. The same Congress that adopted the Four-
teenth Amendment passed Freedmen's Bureau 
legislation, despite strenuous objections that it was 
detrimental to whites. 
Amidst these slippery legal abstractions, a few 
stark facts stand out. At long last the nation has 
realized that a sixth of its population cannot be ex-
cluded from the mainstream of business and profes-
sional life, without irreparable damage to our con-
cept of justice and to the very fabric of our society. 
Yet even as our institutions reach out a welcoming 
hand, there is a grave threat that other pressures will 
slam the door shut in the faces of aspiring minorities. 
WHAT ARE LAW SCHOOLS DOING? 
If we look only at minority applicants for law school, 
about which the most complete data are available, 
one can see the consequences of this brutal squeeze. 
In the past dozen years, minority enrollment in 
American law schools has increased from 700, or 1.3 
percent, to more than 9,500, or 8.1 percent; if 
preferential admissions were abandoned, it is 
estimated that blacks and Chicanos would have com-
prised approximately 1 percent of the 1976 entering 
class-about the same as in 1964. "The progress of a 
decade," as the Association of American Law 
Schools puts it, "would have been wiped out." The 
situation in medical schools would probably have 
been worse. 
Does this mean minority applicants are un-
qualified? Not at all. Their carefully cultivated and 
now burgeoning interest in professional studies has 
ironically coincided with a veritable tidal wave of ap-
plicants in certain favored fields, chiefly law and 
medicine, during the past two decades. Minorities 
entered the contest at a time of skyrocketing creden-
tials; they were brushed aside, not because they were 
unqualified, but because they were outscored by 
superior performers in the GPA (Grade Point 
Average) and LSAT (Law School Admissions Test) 
competitions. 
My own school, Michigan, is a case in point. It 
produced its first black graduate in 1870, and 
through the years it has graduated many able black 
lawyers, judges and public officials. Yet by 1965-66, 
things had come to such a pass that there was not a 
single black student in the entire school-and this at 
a time when race relations had emerged as the coun-
try's most serious and divisive domestic problem. 
That year we instituted a special admissions pro-
gram. Without it, our admissions officer calculates 
we would admit only two or three minority students a 
year. This is so even though the mean LSA T score of 
our entering minority students in 1976 was superior 
to the mean LSA T score of the whole graduating 
class of just 15 years before. To the best of my 
knowledge, we admit no minority students today who 
could not have breezed into my own first-year law 
class in the fall of 1951. 
Nearly everyone acknowledges the need for in-
creased minority representation in the profes-
sions-especially in such a politically influential pro-
fession as the law. It is often contended, however, that 
this can be accomplished without deliberate, color-
conscious decision-making .. Some argue, as did 
Justice Douglas in his opinion jn the earlier, mooted 
DeFunis case involving preferential admissions to law 
school, that the villain is the culturally biased LSAT. 
Such persons insist that a more accurate means 
should be devised to predict the academic perfor-
mance of minority applicants. Others maintain that 
much the same result could be obtained by a race-
neutral criterion like socioeconomic disadvantage. 
Careful studies have disclosed that both these views 
are illusory. The LSA T does not underpredict the law 
school records of blacks and Chicanos; if anything, it 
may slightly overpredict them. Use of socioeconomic 
deprivation as a standard would mean one of two 
things. According to the best available data, only 
about 10 percent of those who would be admitted 
under a disadvantaged special admissions program 
would be black or Chicano. Thus, if the percentage of 
disadvantaged remained equivalent to the percentage 
of minorities currently enrolled (approximately 8 
percent), the number of blacks and Chicanos would 
fall back to around 1 percent. On the other hand, to 
maintain anything like the existing representation of 
minorities in law schools would require the expansion 
of disadvantaged programs to an extent that would be 
professionally foolhardy, politically unacceptable and 
financially impossible. 
The inescapable conclusion is that "color-
blindness" is incompatible with a continuing infusion 
of substantial numbers of minorities into high-level 
business and professional positions, and into the 
educational institutions that prepare persons for such 
positions. Does there exist, then, the "compelling 
state interest" that is necessary to justify a racial 
classification by government under the sterner and 
likelier constitutional test? Confining attention for the 
moment to the legal profession and legal education, I 
think several possible compelling societal interests can 
be identified. 
WHAT IS COMPELLING STATE INTEREST? 
First and foremost is the urgent need for more minor-
ity lawyers. Minorities constitute one-sixth of our 
population; in 1970 they constituted less than one-
fiftieth of the bar. They were even more dispropor-
tionately underrepresented in Mississippi, Alabama, 
Georgia, and other Southern states with large black 
populations. Even the best-intentioned white civil 
rights lawyers in the sixties often confessed their in-
ability to get across to black clients effectively, to win 
their trust and speak their language. At the other end 
of the spectrum, minorities were also dispropor-
tionately underrepresented in prestigious corporate 
law firms, legal departments, and federal agencies. In 
short, minority counsel was lacking for minority 
clients, and the advocacy of minority interests was 
lacking along the corridors of power. 
The lawyer is the preeminent molder of American 
public policy. Although we should like to assume that 
all policy makers will try to deal fairly with all groups 
in our society, we must face up to historical reality: 
no ethnic group can be sure that its interests will be 
SIXTEEN 
fully protected and promoted until it has its share of 
representatives in high places. So the Irish found it to 
be in Boston, so the Italians and Jews found it to be in 
New York, and so the blacks and Hispanics have 
found it to be in every large city in the country. Since 
law is a natural route for the outsider to political and 
economic power, it can be said that opening up the 
law to blacks and other emerging minorities is a com-
pelling concern to the whole of society. 
This is not simply a matter of doing belated justice 
for a previously deprived group. The civility of com-
munity life, the peace of mind of every citizen, and 
public order itself, all ultimately depend on a sense of 
belonging, a sence of sharing by every group in our 
social system. The majority advances its own essential 
interests when it ensures both minority insights and 
minority involvement in the decision-making process. 
The young black from the ghetto, or the young 
Chicano from the barrio, receives an important and 
encouraging message when he learns that an older 
cousin has been accepted by a good law school, or that 
a friend of his uncle has been elected county pro-
secutor, or that any minority person has been ap-
pointed a judge. White middle-class youngsters take 
most of this for granted. For many minorities it may 
be a crucial signal of hope, a window opening on a 
world about which they had never dreamed before. 
Each minority acceptance into law school, each 
minority admission to the bar, may thus have 
reverberations for the good of all society that the 
parallel success of almost no young white could ever 
match. Such contrasting social dividends, it would 
seem, could fairly be taken into account in any in-
telligent calculus of group costs and group benefits. 
Most major law schools have never admitted 
students entirely "by the numbers," that is, solely on 
the basis of GP As and LSA T scores. Interviews and 
letters of recommendation evidencing personal 
qualities important in the practice of law, unusual 
geographical origins or socioeconomic backgrounds, 
significant work experience or graduate training, are 
all commonly given substantial weight in the admis-
sions process. The aim is twofold. First, law schools 
wish to produce the ablest most effective lawyers; 
these are not necessarily the best exam-takers. 
Second, law schools wish to ensure a diverse, 
heterogeneous student body that will contribute to a 
rich and meaningful educational experience for all. 
This latter objective suggests another compelling 
reason for an adequate minority presence in law 
schools. Students preparing for law practice in today's 
world have a vital need to know what blacks, Chicanos 
and other minorities are thinking about. Their in-
sights may have a special value because of their par-
ticular backgrounds and experiences. I recall, for ex-
ample, my own contracts class once coming alive 
when two blacks got into a spirited and perceptive ex-
change about the "mark-up" pricing policies of ghet-
to merchants. It is important, too, for white students 
to be aware of the goals and aspirations of minorities, 
and their attitude about the proper future direction of 
the law. 
In addition, as my colleague Terrance Sandalow 
has observed, the presence of minorities provides an 
opportunity to increase effective communication 
across racial lines. Otherwise there would be left 
unremedied what he describes as "the inability of 
some white students to examine critically arguments 
by a black, or the difficulty experienced by others in 
expressing their disagreements with blacks on such 
issues." 
Medical schools and the medical profession do not 
occupy so central a place as law schools and the legal 
profession in the formulation of general public policy. 
To that extent some of the arguments just advanced in 
favor of preferential minority admissions in law do not 
have quite the same force when applied to medicine, 
or to other technical professions. 
Other arguments carry about equal weight with 
regard to various professions. There is the same need 
for minority practitioners to handle the problems of 
minority clients and minority patients. There is the 
same need for role models for aspiring minority 
youngsters. And there is the same need for minority 
input in resolving the internal policy issues confront-
ing each individual profession. In medicine, for ex-
ample, is there an appropriate allocation of resources 
to deal with such matters as infant mortality, prenatal 
care, cancer research and the development of artificial 
life support systems? Minority views on these ques-
tions might differ considerably from those of whites. 
A NEW DIMENSION IN EQUAL PROTECTION? 
The Supreme Court's decision in Bakke is almost cer-
tain to have implications far beyond the area of 
preferential admissions to professional schools or to 
higher education generally. The federal government's 
whole "affirmative action" program for employees of 
government contractors is likely to be affected. In the 
work force, just as in selective educational institu-
tions, the statistics on minority status are dishearten-
ing. Even after a decade of federally enforced non-
discrimination in employment, minorities are still 
twice as likely as whites not to have jobs. The median 
family income of blacks as compared with that of 
whites has improved negligibly, from 54 percent in 
1964 to 58 percent in the mid-seventies. Minorities 
continue to occupy a disproportionately low percen-
tage of the more attractive positions. If a more fully 
integrated work force and genuine equality of job op-
portunity can be considered compelling state in-
terests, affirmative action programs to boost minority 
employment would seem as legitimate constitutionally 
as preferential admissions policies in education. 
Admissions and employment preferences for 
minorities might be made more palatable for op-
ponents if they could come to realize that at present 
being a minority may well be a valid "qualification" 
for many jobs. There is a demonstrated need today for 
minority role models, especially in the higher status 
occupations. Whites, as well as minorities, stand to 
profit from gleaning the insights of minority pro-
fessors, fellow students, lawyers, business people, 
newspaper writers, and so on. 
More fundamentally, our entire society should be 
(Please turn to page 55) 
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enriched by the opening u-p of a vast new spectrum of 
job opportunities for large, previously excluded 
segments of the population. In this sense, the black 
who is preferred as a teacher or a doctor or a pipefitter 
is not being favored as an individual It merely so hap-
pens that, at this moment in history, minorities are 
endowed with qualities that must be distributed 
throughout a wide range of positions in industry and 
the professions if we are to solve one of our most press-
ing social prnblems. Such an approach may be pro-
foundly at odds with our traditions of individual merit 
and race neutrality, but I believe it accords with the 
realities of the seventies. 
Ultimateiy, the legitimacy of preferential treatment 
for minorities should turn on a judicious appraisal of 
the gains and losses for our society, and not on 
abstract concepts like "color-blindness." Deliberate 
race-based preferences a1·c dangerous medicine, 
justified onJy by the gravest circumstances, and they 
must not be allowed to become habit-fo rming. There 
is the obvious risk of estra11ging white ethnics, and in-
deed all groups who have good historical grounds for 
abhorring any practice that smacks of racial quotas. 
There is the further risk of perpetuating racial 
stereotypes that must be purged even from our sub-
conscious. Balanced against these risks is the certain-
ty that an absolutist approach to color-blindness will 
call a halt to the past decade's promising, if often 
fu mbling, efforts at integration in education and 
employment. 
Bakke presents the Supreme Court with a cruel 
practical choice. It also presents the court with an op-
portunity to find a new dimension in the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and to see that "equal protection" is not 
a mathematician's table of equ ivalents, but a realist's 
injunction to treat alike those who are, in this 
remarkably diverse world, truly alike. & 
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